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BOOK REVIEW
LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS, by Julius Stone. Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 1964. Pp. 454, $10.00.
The proliferation of jurisprudential writing in the contemporary
period tends to inspire skepticism at the appearance of new juris-
prudential works. This is because a number of such efforts have
proved to be rehashings of materials and positions already thor-
oughly analyzed, and the variations offered by the new work as
to vocabulary and analytical approach are too superficial to justify
the effort required to follow the author's particular line of analysis.
Such works are undoubtedly a very beneficial exercise for the au-
thor, and indeed, from the standpoint of progress in the field of
legal philosophy as a whole it is undoubtedly salutary to have as
many legal scholars as possible interesting themselves in such ef-
forts. But it does not follow from this that all such works profitably
absorb the time of the reading public. But if in that sense we may
suffer from some surfeit of jurisprudential writings that find outlet
in publication, suffice it to say that Julius Stone's contribution
forms no part of it. While his work is not original in the sense
that it reiterates philosophical positions already extensively ex-
pounded elsewhere, his exposition has real value in the depth and
organization of scholarship he brings to bear, and in the linkage he
demonstrates between jurisprudence and fundamental principles of
general philosophy and logic; unlike many of our jurisprudents, he
seems to be no amateur philosopher.
The jurisprudential position that Mr. Stone represents is the
legal facet of what is widely known as the English school of linguis-
tic analytical positivism. It is a school in more or less direct line
of descent from Austin in that it utilizes his theory of a logical
and analytical method, though without building on the particular
doctrines he expounded. In conformity with the fashion prevalent
in the haut monde of jurisprudence, this school eschews the crudi-
ties of the bombasts between the basic positions of legal positivism
and natural law. It is rather disarming and seductive in this re-
spect, and somewhat like the sociological school of jurisprudence
attempts to rise above the quarrel by demonstrating that both of
these opposing positions have their legitimate spheres of operation,
but without either of them having the right to occupy the juris-
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prudential throne. The positivists should be satisfied with their
allotment of that facet of the totality of the law concerned with
logical analysis, the natural law adherents with justice, and both
should admit the sociological school into the triumvirate that truly
heads the entire domain of jurisprudence. But, as so often hap-
pens, the "compromise candidate" merely becomes himself an
added contender for power, rather than bringing about the resigna-
tion of the old opponents and the cessation of their inconclusive
contendings. But whether this purportedly neutral stance is illusory
or not, there is much to be said in favor of a jurisprudential pres-
entation that is not overtly directed toward the partisan polemics
that are so frequently aired.
Mr. Stone, in essaying the entire field of jurisprudence, makes
a triune division of it in accordance with this theory. In 1946 he
had set forth his full jurisprudential thought in one volume in THE
PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW. He is now in the process
of expanding and refining his work up to the moment in a three
volume project, of which this is the first volume. This deals with
"analytical jurisprudence" on the theory that this is only one of
the three principal phases of the totality of jurisprudence. The two
other volumes, dealing with the other two phases, are appearing in
1965 under the respective titles of HUMAN LAW AND HUMAN JUS-
TICE and SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE. The
present volume, then, is a partial rather than complete exposition
of a point of view. Implicit in this total position is of course the
proposition that it is possible meaningfully to dissect jurisprudence
in this fashion, and it is precisely at this fundamental premise
that Mr. Stone and his colleagues can find themselves embroiled
in the classic controversy of jurisprudence, howevermuch they may
feel abused at such disregard of the sanctuary they have sought
to construct for themselves.
This book carries forward very effectively the primary mission
of this school of analytical positivism especially in the analysis
offered on the fundamental relationships between language and law
and logic and law. This has as its main purpose the clarifying
of juristic thinking and to give awareness of the proper uses and
limitation for the law of the great intellectual implements of logic
and language. The inevitable "multisignation" of words is analyzed,
as well as fatuity in which we too often indulge of supposing we
can reduce a word to any one objective and stable meaning ("uni-
signation"); but on the other hand, there are outer limits to the
range of meanings that a word may have. And although logic is a
valuable and indispensable procedure for the jurist, there are limits
to its proper use, but it is subject to being employed in an abusive
and excessive manner in juristic concerns, and also its purported
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use may be illusory. Logic can only operate on the basis of given
premises that are submitted to its ministrations, but logic may
have nothing to do with the selection of the premises themselves;
hence a judicial decision purporting to be "logically" compelled
on the basis of antecedent authorities may represent only a logical
structure based on the premises the court selected, but no logic
may have been involved (or could have been involved) in the se-
lection of these premises. The background of the average Anglo-
American jurist is such that this book will afford him some fresh
insights and invite a re-examination of some of his most hallowed
assumptions. In such ways Mr. Stone shows himself as a parti-
cularly faithful and effective disciple of the school of thought to
which he adheres in presenting its most valuable contributions to
the juristic world.
Extensive chapters are specifically devoted to analyses of the
systems of Austin, Kelsen, and Hohfeld. This, of course, has been
a favorite jurisprudential exercise for some time, but is done well
here, even though this may not be one of the primary values of
the book. Perhaps the greatest and most original value of the
book is the pervasive one of linking jurisprudence with the more
general underlying systems of formal philosophy and logic. Most
of our jurisprudential writings do not consciously base themselves
on formal techniques of philosophy, and indeed, there is resistance
to considering "jurisprudence" as the equivalent of "philosophy
of law." But, whether or not a foundation of jurisprudence in the
formal techniques of general philosophy is properly necessary, it is
clearly desirable and enriching for the jurisprudent to be thus forti-
fied. This more technical philosophical content may sometimes
make the reading rather "heavy going," but the potential results
are well worth the effort.
JOHN H. CRABB*
POLInCS AND LAW, by Gerhard Leibholz.** Leyden: A. W. Syth-
off, 1965. Pp. 339.
Politics and Law is not, as the title might suggest, a systematic
inquiry into the intriguing relationship between political power and
the realm of law, but rather a collection of selected essays and
lectures which the author had published previously. The previous
* A.B., University of Michigan; M.A., Univernity of Detroit; LL.B., Harvard; LL.M.,
New York University. Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law;
Visiting Professor of Law, Lovanium University, Leopoldville, Congo.
** Professor of Public Law and Political Science, University of Goettingen.
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publication of most of the essays and lectures took place during the
1940's; however, a few of the essays are of more recent date.
None of the articles in the collection has undergone any significant
change or has been brought up to date because, in the author's
opinion, "his analysis of the basic concepts and the political views
put forward at that time still largely holds good today." 1
In keeping with the author's professional background as a legal
scholar, political scientist, and since 1951 an Associate Justice of
the German Federal Constitution Court, the essays and lectures
are grouped under three headings: Political Science, Politics, and
Law. Within these groupings the offerings are far-ranging in scope,
reflect the scholarly mind of the author, and are evidence of his
intellectual depth. However, the content of the selections is at times
repetitive and the arrangement of the articles under the three
categories is not always methodical.
In the part of the book dealing with Political Science, Profes-
sor Leibholz examines primarily the essence of politics, the nature
and various forms of democracy, and the problems of national
character. It is particularly in this section that this reviewer
strongly disagrees with the author that his essays need not be
updated. Political theory has made tremendous strides in the last
twenty years. Political scientists have concentrated their efforts
and spilled much ink on reconceptualizing and defining terms, con-
structing theoretical frameworks for a more rigorous explanation,
of political phenomena, and in general making political science more
"scientific" in the sense of approaching the methodology employed
by the natural sciences. A serious consideration of the essence of
politics cannot afford to neglect the searching contributions that
have been made during this period by such men as David Easton,
Arnold Brecht, Robert Dahl, Carl J. Friedrich and Leslie Lipson.2
For example Leibholz states:
A relationship to the State becomes political when, in one
way or another, the fundamental ideological principles upon
which the State rests and which determines its specific
character are affected. Those questions are political which
in some way or other touch upon the essential common
interests and the supreme aims of the State. Those deci-
sions are political which seek to preserve the existence of
the State, to further its unity or aim at the integration of
the social organism which we call the nation.8
This rambling characterization of what is political may well
1. Pp. 9, 10. All page numbers, unless otherwise noted, refer to the book under
review.
2. See, BRECHT, POLITICAL THEORY (1959) ; DAHL, MODERN POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1963);
EASTON, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM (1953); FRIEDRICH, MAN AND HIS GOVERNMENT (1963)




have been sharpened and refined if the author had re-examined
his conceptualization in the light of Dahl's bold definition that a
political system is "any persistent pattern of human relationships
that involves, to a significant extent, power, rule, or authority'"4
or by taking into consideration Friedrich's perceptive statement
that "it is the essence of politics, in a way, to argue about justice,
that is to say, to argue about who may be compared with for
what treatment. ' 5 With regard to the term political science Leib-
holz asserts that "the will of the nation as a whole forms the
crux of modern political science." 6 While one may agree that the
formation of the national will, be it the work of a leading elite or
a party or a dynasty and its servants, is indeed an important
subject of concern for political science, it suggests a very narrow
definition. Professor Easton's characterization of political science
appears to be more rigorous and profound when he states that
it is "concerned with every way in which values are allocated for
a society, whether formally enunciated in a law or lodged in the
consequences of a practice. '"
An interesting distinction is made by Professor Leibholz between
representative and what he calls "plebiscitary" democracy. The
term representative democracy is to be applied where the general
will of a sovereign people is formed by means of the political
principle of representation. The representative authorities may be
parliamentary bodies, committees, or even single persons. In the
plebiscitary democracy the representative principle plays no part
in the formation of the common will. An example of this system,
according to Leibholz, is the modern mass-democratic party-state.
There the freedom of the members of parliamentary and other
"representative" bodies has been lost through a more or less ex-
tensive dependence on the party organizations and groups whose
leaders exercise a decisive influence over the speeches and votes
of popular representatives. In view of the development of this type
of democracy, Leibholz suggests that the usual schematic division
into direct and indirect democracy is in need of revision. According
to the traditional division the party state is a form of indirect
democracy. The author claims, however, that it is in fact a de-
mocracy which is structurally related to direct democracy and
consequently should be treated systematically in political theory
under the latter category."
In much of the book Professor Leibholz strikes a strong religious
note which is revealed in the second essay of the collection, en-
4. DAHL, MODERN POLITICAL ANALYSIS, Op. cit. 8upra note 2, at 6.
5. FRIEDRICH, MAN AND His GOVERNMENT, OP. cit. supra note 2, at 256.
6. P. 79
7. EASTON, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, Op. it. 8upra note 2, at 131.
S. Pp. 33-36.
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titled "Politics and Natural Law." In this essay Leibholz asserts
that:
. . .[T]heonomic thinking requires that political power be
brought into the service of God to fulfill His purposes. Only
then is a formally established power legitimate. Only then
does it possess the genuine authority, i.e. the title to be
obeyed .... The most important purpose and the fundamental
value which power has to serve is to guard right and to
serve justice. .... 9
At the same time, Leibholz observes that the principles of nat-
ural law must not be "separated from their dependence on the
eternal and sacred justice which has been revealed by God." the
majority of contemporary political scientists is likely to question
this close tie between political power and religion and may object
to the essentially religious content of natural law, but for the author
these are the core concepts of his philosophy.
The religious leitmotiv is resumed by Leibholz with vigor in
the essays and lectures grouped under the heading of Politics in
which he deals primarily with various problems of Nazi Germany,
with her relationship to the world, and with the future of Europe.
From 1938 to 1951 the author lived in England and it seems to be
then that he developed his thesis of the militant Christian Church,
which itself must be political and whose task it is "powerfully and
repeatedly to press into national and international life Christian
principles such as the sacredness of the human personality, the
sovereignty of God above all nations, the universal brotherhood
of men, the Christian power of love and forgiveness and the ex-
istence of universal moral laws." 10 Specifically, Leibholz advocated
the employment of what he calls Christian "totalitarianism" in
the battle against anti-Christian totalitarian states such as Nazi
Germany and the Soviet Union. Fearing that liberal democracy
may not possess the spiritual thrust to overcome the political prob-
lems existing in many parts of the world because "liberalism has
only developed where a solid, well-defined traditional structure of
political values was already present,".1 the author maintains that
Christianity is the only real hope of a stricken and suffering world.
Although these words were part of a lecture delivered in 1942,
Leibholz has pointed perceptively to a characteristic of liberal de-
mocracy which today renders its adoption by the new states of
Africa and Asia so difficult.
With regard to Allied policy toward Germany during World
War II, Leibholz questioned the wisdom of the demand for uncondi-
tional surrender and advocated a careful distinction between the
9. P. 20.




Hitler government and the German people. He discusses in some
detail the opposition movements to Hitler prior and during the
War and argues with skill and knowledge against the thesis often
heard and generally accepted by this reviewer that Nazism should
be regarded as the natural culmination of German historical and
cultural development during the previous 150 years.
In his discussion of European unity Professor Leibholz focuses
on the problem of sovereignty and on the transition from the age
of the nation-state to the age of ideology. He raises the question
whether the concept of sovereignty with its insistence on compre-
hensiveness, indivisibility, and perpetuality is not outmoded today
when it is apparent that certain sovereign powers of the member
states of the European Community have been transferred to "supra-
national" institutions. Considering sovereignty essentially a politi-
cal and not a legal concept, Leibholz holds that it remains valid
as long as a state retains the capacity to say the final decisive
word on the political plane. The loss of such capacity, however, en-
tails the state's reduction to satellite status which deprives it of
its sovereignty. With respect to the transfer of powers by the mem-
ber states to the Community institutions, the author believes that
the states remain today (1960) still in a position to cut loose from
the supranational Communities by invoking the clausula rebus suc
stantibus. Since the Communities are unable to prevent the seces-
sion of one of their members by means of sanctions, he holds
that the sovereignty of the member states has not been impaired.
In this connection one should read the very recent decision of
the Court of Justice of the European Communities in the E.N.E.L.
case in which the Court declared:
Contrary to other international treaties, the Treaty insti-
tuting the E.E.C. has created its own legal order which
was integrated with the national order of the member
States the moment the Treaty came into force and which
the domestic courts have to take into account; as such it
is binding upon them... [T]he integration, with the laws
of each member State, of provisions having a Community
source, and more particularly the terms and spirit of the
Treaty, have as a-corollary the impossibility, for the mem-
ber States, to give precedence to a unilateral and subse-
quent measure which is inconsistent with it against a legal
order accepted by them upon a basis of reciprocity. 12
While Leibholz maintains that sovereignty as a political concept
retains its validity today, he raises the question whether, in a
world divided along ideological lines, the principle of sovereignty
does not in fact become a vehicle by which primarily ideological
12. Vol. 2, No. 2 COMMON MAI.4tJ= IAw REvIEw 197, 197-198 (1964).
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aims rather than national aims are pursued. He also observes that
in the event of a conflict between nation-state loyalty and common
ideological and political beliefs, the duties arising from citizenship
in a given nation may no longer automatically take preference
over belief in an ideology that transcends the realm of the nation-
state. s Although undoubtedly the transition from the age of the
nation-state to the age of ideology would open up an interesting
vista of shifting loyalties--even the development of a European
ideology is not inconceivable-the expectation of such a shift may
be somewhat premature. The often bitter conflicts among the mem-
bers of the Communist bloc and the recent manifestations of re-
emerging nationalism in Western Europe furnish clear evidence
that the days of the Nation-state are far from numbered.
The section of the book entitled Law begins with an examination
of the foundations of justice and law in which the author again
strongly argues for his belief that only the Christian doctrine of man
is the one sure foundation of justice.
Most of the remaining essays deal with various aspects of the
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. The most interesting
point in these essays is the similarity of problems besetting both
that Court and the U. S. Supreme Court. Charges of judicial acti-
vism and "government by judges" hurled against the German
Court have a familiar ring in the United States. The issue of
"equality before the law" has repeatedly taxed the ingenuity of
the German justices, but their approach to this issue has oftentimes
been more aggressive than that of the Supreme Court, at least prior
to Baker v. Carr.14 Professor Leibholz acknowledges with approval
that under the German Constitution of 1949 (Basic Law) the Court
has been incorporated into the State's policy making process; how-
ever, he fully recognizes that the Court cannot substitute its own
concrete political considerations for the concrete political considera-
tions of the legislature. Experience has taught the American public
that the line between permissible and non-permissible judicial policy
making is blurred and often difficult to determine, and it seems
that the German Constitutional Court has also been wrestling from
the very beginning with the solution of this .problem.15
What Professor Leibholz has possibly overlooked in his book
is that not only constitutional courts or a supreme court may be
engaged in policy making, but that also lower courts may under
certain circumstances become policy makers. Such courts also
meet demands, settle disputes, and resolve arguments in the poli-
tical system. Examples are: groups seeking to resist civil rights
18. Pp. 225-280.
14. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
15. See Leibholz's detailed discussion of the "Southwest" case. Pp. 286-295.
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appealing to state courts for an injunction; or individuals finding
themselves defeated at the polls may turn to the courts; or minor-
ities may seek refuge in the courts from majority-dominated legis-
latures or governors. Finally, a taxpayer may obtain standing
before a court and ask for an injunction or other remedy if expen-
diture of public monies is involved.16 It is this kind of relationship
between politics and law that needs a thorough, systematic explora-
tion, possibly on a comparative basis, which in this reviewer's
opinion might yield fascinating insights and lead to a better under-
standing of the political system.
To conclude the review of Professor Leibholz's book, there can
be little doubt that his essays and lectures are highly stimulating
and most challenging, even though some of them have now no
more than historical value. They are written with great perception
and skill and reflect the author's profound historical and legal
knowledge. One may not agree with parts or all of his legal and
political philosophy, but one must admire the forcefulness and the
deep conviction with which the author argues for his beliefs.
WERNER FELD*
16. See, Jacob & Vines, The Role of the Judiciary in American State Politics, in
JUDICIAL DECISxON-MAKING 245-256 (Schubert ed. 1963).
* Chairman, Department of Government, Louisiana State University, New Orleans.
LL.B. 1933, Berlin; Ph.D. 1962, Tulane. Author, THE COURT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES: NEW DIMENsIoN IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (1964).

